

# TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the  
United States of America

OUTGOING AMEMBASSY PARIS

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W (C)  
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Control: 410

Date: September 7, 1961  
8:00 P.M.

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General Norstad had one and half hour talk with Chancellor Adenauer this morning September 7 in Bonn. Atmosphere was very cordial and Chancellor appeared alert and confident. He gave evidence on several occasions, however, of continued sensitivity concerning Vice President Johnson's visit to Berlin and possible boost this may have given to Brandt in forthcoming elections. Following were highlights of conversation:

(1) Adenauer said he wished to talk with Norstad about FRG Armed Forces, indicating that he had some political and military difficulties in connection with speed-up of military preparations, in light of Berlin ~~crisis~~. In response, Norstad gave background of his presentation to NAC on measures he proposed be taken by NATO countries to meet present needs. He stressed need to bring FRG divisions to 90 per cent effectiveness. To accomplish this, there would be three possibilities:

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retain personnel now in service; call up reservists; increase draft.

In order to have impact in next three months, only first of these possibilities would be meaningful. Norstad in summing up said the crisis exists for West and contribution is urgently needed from Federal Republic. Only practical way for FRG to accomplish goal set by NATO would be to retain personnel now in service who scheduled for release September 30. Norstad also made point that he could not persuade other NATO countries to meet their requirements if FRG did not meet its requirements.

Adenauer agreed with Norstad concerning necessity for holding personnel in Armed Services beyond September 30. He said he would talk to political leaders in afternoon to inform them of his decision and instructions would be issued providing for retention of personnel for three months beyond September 30 date. Other contingents scheduled for release subsequently would also be held for additional three month period if this appeared necessary.

Norstad suggested that any FRG press statements or instructions to troops could indicate that action to retain personnel in service is required by NATO in order to fulfill FRG commitments to NATO on expedited basis.

(2) In conversation with Strauss prior to meeting with Chancellor,

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Control: 410

- 3 -

Date:

Norstad had mentioned desirability of FRG taking steps with regard to (a) extension of term of military service, (b) improvement in method of dealing with infrastructure problems (land control and federal-state relationships), (c) emergency legislation. In subsequent talk with Chancellor, Strauss raised these three points and Chancellor replied: "If we win elections, these matters will be taken care of."

(3) Chancellor remarked to Norstad that "sometimes he is worried about Washington". It seemed apparent he was concerned that US position on certain aspects of Berlin problem might be insufficiently firm. In reply, Norstad (having in mind German fears that emphasis on conventional weapons implied reluctance use nuclear weapons) stressed solidity and firmness of President and other top officials concerning Berlin, and he expressed conviction that US would use atomic weapons in defense of Europe if necessary. Norstad also mentioned impending arrival four F-100 squadrons and additional B-47's as indications of US strength and determination. Adenauer seemed reassured. ~~Norstad also mentioned that he had brought to the attention of the President the fact that the US would use atomic weapons in defense of Europe if necessary.~~

(4) Adenauer raised possibility of uprising in East Germany, saying this would present extremely difficult problem for FRG. Adenauer

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- 4 -

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said "some people" in West Germany think FRG should intervene in event East German uprising. He asked Norstad's views on this subject. Norstad said he could imagine nothing more dangerous than West German intervention in East Germany, which he felt would very probably lead to all-out war. In his view, it was essential that FRG show greatest restraint in event of uprising. Adenauer indicated his agreement and in response to Norstad's suggestion that he ~~might~~ inform Allies of his thinking on this point, said that he might write letter to President on subject.

(5) Adenauer referred to Stikker's earlier complaints about his staff and inquired if there had been improvement. Norstad said he thought Stikker still not completely satisfied but situation was improving. Norstad added that Stikker has frequently complained about lack of information but now RPT now seems pleased with arrangements made for him to receive ~~appropriate~~ information from US channel as appropriate. Adenauer remarked that he has issued instructions that Stikker should be given fullest possible information from German side.

LYOG

Drafted and authenticated by:

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